RECONSTRUCTING THE ROMAN LAW
OF REAL SECURITY
ROGER J. GOEBEL*

The essential idea of real security is that the debtor transfer
to the creditor a possessory interest in a specific item or aggregate
of property, chattel or realty, to serve as security for the loan.
There are four possible generic types: (1) the debtor vests both
ownership and possession of the property in the creditor, subject
to a personal obligation to reconvey on repayment; (2) the debtor
vests ownership in the creditor, but retains possession of the property by leave of the creditor; (3) the debtor retains ownership
of the property, but grants possession irrevocably to the creditor
until repayment of the debt; and (4) the debtor retains both ownership and possession of the property, but transfers to the creditor
a possessory interest in the property.' These four types represent
stages of increasingly sophisticated abstraction in the relationship
of legal interests denominated as real security.
Roman law knew all four of these modes under the names of
mcncipatio cum fiducia or in iure cessia cum fiducia (commonly
known and hereafter designated simply as fiduci), pignus, and
hypotheca. The exact character of the real security encompassed
by each of these terms is difficult to ascertain and lately has occasioned some dispute among Roman law scholars. As a preliminary working definition it may be stated that fiducia. indicated
the transfer of ownership to the creditor, who generally but not
always retained possession as well; pignus indicated the retention
of ownership by the debtor, but the transfer of possession to the
creditor; and hypotheca indicated the retention of both ownership
and possession by the debtor, but with the creation of a possessory
interest in the creditor.
The traditional standard view of the Roman law of real security
would define the Roman institutions as above, and present a historical view basically as follows. 2 The earliest such institution in
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'Technically spealdng, the first two forms are not total real security, as
the debtor has only a personal right to recover the res; however, the idea of
transferring the total property or some property interest in return for credit
essential concept herein to be considered.
is the
2
See, e.g., Buckland, Text-Book of Roman Law 473-81 (2d ed. 1932)
[hereinafter cited as Buckland, Text-Book]; Jbrs-Kunkel-Wenger, Rbmisches
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the republic was fidueia, in fact and in, law a transfer of ownership to the creditor, conditioned upon repayment. Possession was
also in the creditor, although he might grant it by leave or by
lease, in precario, to the debtor, rarely in the early days but quite
commonly by the late republic. Fiducia worked harshly from the
debtor's point of view, for the creditor had the legal power to
alienate the pledged property. True, the debtor had an actio
fiduciae which penalized the creditor with infamia for a wrongful
sale, but this personal remedy did not enable the debtor to recover
his property.
Accordingly, at some point in the early republic pignus arose,
which gave the creditor possession but left the debtor with ownership. The debtor now could protect his ownership against third
parties by an actio in rem, while the creditor could utilize praetorian interdicts to protect his possession. But the debtor normally
could no longer use the pledged property. To enable him to do so,
the creditor increasingly, especially in landlord-tenant situations,
allowed the debtor possession by lease or leave in precario. From
this developed the hypotheca, sometime in the mid-empire, in
which both ownership and possession were left in the debtor, but
the creditor obtained a possessory interest entitling him to the
ultimate legal right to possession. The hypotheca.s use was limited
so long as the creditor could only exert his interest against the
debtor, but when the Edict of Hadrian granted the creditor an
actio in rem, the actio Serviana, against all third parties, the
hypotheca became predominant at least for real property. By the
late empire the distinctions between pignus and hypotheca were
blurred and the terms often used interchangeably, and they were
so used in the Corpus Juris Civilis. Meanwhile, at some point in
the mid-empire, fiducia, which had survived so long only because
creditors found it a useful device, finally became extinct along
with the institutions of mancipatio and in iure cessio themselves.
This interpretation of the history of Roman real security was
everywhere prevalent until the end of the nineteenth century. Then
an attack was launched on the basis of independent research by
two scholars, Wigmore in a series of articles in the Harvard Law
Review in 1897, 3 and the Swedish romanist Martin Fehr in a dissertation published in 1910.- Their view is that no such institution
as the hypotheca has an initial separate genesis in the mid-empire.
On the contrary, it was the old institution of fiducia which had
Recht 152-62 (3d ed. 1949) [hereinafter cited as Jfrs-Kunkel]; Schulz, Classical3 Roman Law 400-27 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Schulz].
Wigmore, The Pledge-Idea: A Study in Comparative Legal Ideas, 10 Harv.
L. Rev.
321, 389 (1897); 11 Harv. L. Rev. 18, 32-35 n.3 (1897).
4
Fehr, Beitriige zum rmischen Pfandrecht in der klassichen Zeit (Upsala

1910). This work was not available to the author.
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evolved into the complete antithesis of its original form: instead
of ownership and possession in the creditor, both were left in the
debtor. In the late empire it was the distinction between pignus
and this new fiduci which blurred, resulting in interchangeable
terminology. The term hypotheca, a Greek word, arises only because the compilers, familiar with a corresponding Greek institution, chose to use it to replace fiducia everywhere the latter appeared in the selections incorporated in the Corpus Juris Civilis.
This new thesis could hardly be said to have provoked a raging
controversy, 5 but there is some dispute among present writers as
to its validity. The Wigmore-Fehr view has been largely adopted
by Albertario, Sohm and Mitteis, while Cuq, Girard and Manigk
have totally rejected it. Rabel, Kaser, J6rs and Kunkel have received it with respect and adopted it in part." Anglo-American
writers, e.g., Buckland, Schulz, Radin, Burdick, Lee and McNair,
have largely ignored it. 7 It is the purpose of this article to present
an appraisal of the historical evolution of the Roman real securities and a neutral delineation of the substantive law underlying
each possible mode - ownership and possession in the creditor,
ownership in the creditor with possession in the debtor, possession
in the creditor but ownership in the debtor, and ownership and
possession in the debtor with a possessory interest in the creditor
entitling him to eventual legal possession.
I.

HISTORICAL EVOLUTION

Attempting to reconstruct the classical law of Roman pledge
by analysis of the Corpus Juris Civilis and the scattered independent texts available is difficult at best. To go further and try to
determine the exact nature of the republican law leads us into
the sphere of educated guesswork. Nonetheless the outlines of
such law can be discerned with approximate accuracy.
The Twelve Tables, so far as they are extant, contain no reference to any type of real security.8 However, they do contain penal5
A total of three articles in English and perhaps two or three times that
in Europe scarcely qualifies as a raging controversy even by academic

standards.

6See Wigmore, The Pledge-MortgageIdea in Roman Law: A Revolutionary
Interpretation, 36 Ill. L. Rev. 371, 388-90 (1941) and articles cited therein.
See also Jrs-Kunkel 156 n.3; Rabel, Real Securities in Roman Law, 1 Seminar
32, 45 n.53 (1943).
7Buckland does reject the view that hypotheca has been interpolated

throughout the Corpus Juris Civilis, but does not mention Wigmore or Fehr.
Buckland, Text-Book 475 n.8. Jolowicz merely notes the dispute without drawing any conclusions of his own. Jolowicz Historical Introduction to Roman
Law8 319 n.1 (2d ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as Jolowicz].
Unless Table VI.1 can be construed as referring to fiducia cum ereditore,
which is doubtful. See Jolowicz 299. Erbe declares there is not even a secure
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ties for wrongdoing by persons to whom goods have been committed for safekeeping.9 This earliest form of bailment for safekeeping was called fiducia cum amico, and was close kin to the
early transfer of title for pledge, the fiducia cum creditore. A reasonable hypothesis is that the existence of the fiducia cum amico,
with its conditional transfer of property to a friend with legal
protection for a future reconveyance, inspired creditors and debtors with the idea of the similar transfer cum creditore.10 But the
matter is by no means free from doubt, and indeed it is not even
1
certain that fiducia cum amico preceded fiducia cur creditore."
Jolowicz speculates that originally both types of transfer in
fiduci contained no legal sanction for retransfer. He argues that
the informality of the arrangement and the use of the word fiducia
(fides) "points to a time when it was unenforceable, and the
transferor had to rely on the faith of his friend or creditor."'
The theory gains weight when it is remembered that the Romans
consistently preferred personal security to real security, a preference accounted for by the extraordinary character (in Schulz's
phrase) of "Roman fides, Roman pedantic accuracy, honesty and
reliability in business matters. . . ."13 But if such use of fiducia
ever occurred, it was certainly extremely early and legal sanctions
undoubtedly existed by the time of the Twelve Tables.
A much more probable nascent stage in Roman pledge law was
one in which the object pledged was summarily forfeited to the
creditor on non-payment at maturity-and this whether the ownership had been given to the creditor in fiduci,1 4 or only the possession in pignus.15 Direct support for this theory is found in Pomponius, D.20.5.9.1, and Scaevola, D.46.1.63, in which reference is
made to the creditor who possess the right to sell the pledge under
a special clause granting him the right to sue the debtor for any
unrealized deficiency - the argument being that such a clause only
arose because originally the creditor had but a bare forfeiture
right to the pledge itself.16 Indirect evidence is found in the
basis for the opinion that fiduci of any sort is as old as the Twelve Tables.
Erbe,
Die Fiduzia in R6mischen Recht 4 (1940).
9
Table III.1, The Civil Law 62 (vol. 1 Scott transl. 1932).
1oWigmore, supra note 3, 11 Harv. L. Rev. 32 n.2.
"Erbe, op. cit. supra note 8, at 9 & n.1.
i2Jolowicz 299. The actio fiduciae for fiduci cum creditore is, however,
quite old and may date to the time of Q. Mucius. Ibid.
'sSchulz 402. See also Kaser, Das R6mische Privatrecht § 108, at 383
(1955) [hereinafter cited as Kaser]; cf. Schulz, Principles of Roman Law 237
(1936).
14Jolowicz 318. But see Erbe, op. cit. supra note 8, at 2-4, wherein it is
argued forcefully that the pignus Verfallpfand, or forfeiture pledge, is the
oldest Roman pledge form, and the more technical fiducia or Eigenturmspfand,
ownership, is, contrary to prevailing opinion, a later pledge form.
transferring
15Jolowicz 317.
11d. at 318 n.1; J6rs-Kunkel 152 n.2.
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prevalence of this forfeiture type of pledge among the Germans
and Greeks, implying a similar stage of development among the
Romans: "Wie im griechischen und deutschen, so scheint auch. im
rdmischen Recht das Verfallpfand die Urform des Pfandverhdltnisses dargestellt zu haben."'1 7 The fact that in later times the
creditor clearly had to sell the pledge, returning any surplus to
the debtor, "proves, not that Roman law was unlike cognate systems in its infancy, but that here, as in other cases, the legal
genius of the Romans enabled them to develop in a peculiar way
18
institutions which they originally shared with other peoples.
The legal essence of the forfeiture pledge was that it substituted
purely in rem for any in personam rights the creditor might otherwise have. The creditor bore all the risks of loss of the peldge
(periculum) and could not recover any deficiency should the pledge
be worth less than the debt (reliquum) ; on the other hand, he need
not return to the debtor any excess should the pledge be of greater
value than the debt (superfluum or hyperocha). Since the creditor could always guarantee in advance that the object pledged
exceeded (perhaps considerably) in value the amount of the debt,
the forfeiture pledge was quite advantageous from his viewpoint.
The disadvantage to the debtor undoubtedly accounted for the
demise of this pledge form. But when that occurred is disputed;
for pignus, undoubtedly it occurred in the mid-republic. Thereafter
the same end was achieved only by agreements permitting forfeiture to the creditor.19 Probably the same evolution to forfeiture by
agreement only occurred in fiducia cur creditore also, although
Jolowicz thinks the automatic forfeiture type prevailed at least to
20
Cicero's time.
There is general agreement that at least in the late republic
and early empire there were two distinct types of pledge, that in
which the creditor had ownership, called the fiducia cum creditore,
and that in which he merely had possession, called pignus.21 Between these two there were some major differences in legal effect.
In the fiduci. cum creditore, the creditor or fiduciarius had full
17 Sohm-Mitteis-Wenger, Institutionen des R~imischen Rechts 342 (17th ed.
1949) [hereinafter cited as Sohm-Mitteis]. "As in Greek and German law, so
also in Roman law the forfeiture pledge appears to have been the original
form of the pledge relationship." (transl. supplied by author). Accord, Kaser
§ 111, at 393; Wigmore, supra note 3, 11 Harv. L. Rev. 25-27; Wigmore, supra
note 6 at 378-79.
18Jolowicz 318.

19 Cf. Rabel, supra note 6, at 36.
20Jolowicz
318.
21
See, e.g., Kaser 385. "Die Klassiker halten sie (fiducia and pignus) im

allgemeinen streng auseinander, obschon die Regelungen auch jetzt noch teil-

weise parallel laufen."

(The classical writers usually strictly distinguished

the two forms, although the applicable rules already at least in part were
parallel.)
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ownership of the pledge and could pass good title to third parties,
had an actio rei vindicatio against all third parties, and a personal
actio contrcria against the debtor for any interference with the
pledge. 22 However, the creditor was under a positive duty to reconvey on payment, and the debtor had a personal actio fiduciae
if the creditor mishandled the pledge, refused to return it, or transferred it to third parties.2 3 In subject matter, fiduci. was limited
to property transferred by mancipation (i.e., res mancipi) or in
lure cessio, and hence was available only to Roman citizens who
could transfer property in that manner. 24 Transfer of bonitary
ownership by traditio could not suffice because the actio fiduciae
25
was not available in such a transfer.
In pignus, normally the creditor would have possession while
the debtor retained ownership. The debtor now was the one who
possessed actiones in rem to protect his interest, the actio rei yindicatio against third parties and the actio pigneraticic against the
creditor to compel reconveyance on repayment. 26 The creditor
could protect his interest in the object pledged through praetorian
possessory interdicts against third parties, the interdicts uti possidetis, utrubi and unde vi according to Buckland. 27
Despite these legal differences, there were two major aspects
in which fiducia and pignus were the same, and which brought
them to increasingly close affinity: the possibility of possession
in precario by the debtor, and the manner in which the creditor
could realize the security value of the pledge in case of nonpayment.
The critical factor for the creditor in fiduci was his receipt of
ownership, not possession - "Besitziibertragungwar dabei nicht
notwendig.' '28 The debtor might be allowed to retain the use of
the pledge by lease or simple license, both of which were known
as possession in precario. Today it is known that possession,
though usual, was not required to be in the creditor by pignus
either.29 Nor was such pignus without possession a late innovation: Cato (234-149 B.C.) contracted for the sale of olives on
the tree, and the purchaser pledged everything he brought into
the grove as security.30 Mitteis, following Fehr's lead, would dis22
Buckland, Text-Book 471.
23
1bido; J~rs-Kunkel 154.
24

Erbe, op. cit. supr. note 8, at 12; Kaser 385; Sohm-Mitteis 343.
25Schulz
406.
26
Sohm-Mitteis 343.
27Buckland,
Text-Book 475.
28
Sohm-Mitteis 341. "There was no necessity for the transfer of possession." (transl. supplied by author). Accord, Buckland, Text-Book 474.
29Jolowicz 319; Jrs-Kunkel 156; Kaser § 38, at 126; Sohm-Mitteis 344-45;
Rabel, supra,note 6, at 38; Wigmore, supra. note 3, 11 Harv. L. Rev. 23-25.
3°Jolowicz 320; Kaser § 110, at 389.

19611

ROMAN ,LAW OF REAL SECURITY

tinguish pledges in pignus into pignore da re and pignori obligari
according, respectively, to whether the creditor received possession or not.3 ' Further discussion of possessionless pignus may be
reserved until the issue of the hkypotheca is reached, but one observation is here timely. Clearly if the debtor retained possession,
whether the pledge was fiducia or pignus was far less significant:
the debtor had no need for an actio fiducia or an actie,pigneratica.
For both fiducia and pignus, the end of the old automatic forfeiture rule meant that there was no way of realizing the security
of the pledge in case of non-payment save by agreement. Two types
of agreements became common, the lex commissori, which provided for the forfeiture of the pledge to the creditor, and the
pactum de vendendo, or distrahendo, which gave the creditor the
right to sell. 32 In case of sale, the creditor had a personal action
against the debtor for any deficiency (reliquum) but was liable
for any excess (superfluum or hyperochc). The lex commissoria
always had to be an express clause, but the pactum de vendendo
probably became implied in classical times, and was an absolute
33
right even in the face of contrary agreement by Justinian's day.
A powerful creditor could extort a valuable pledge from a debtor
for a trifling loan and then acquire it by the tex commissoria; for
such abuse Constantine finally abolished the clause, though there
is evidence that it remained in use for some time after.3 4 Similarly
to protect the debtor against an unwarranted sale, an involved
system of notice and right of redemption was developed in late
5
classical times and amplified by Justinian.3
So much for the law of the pignus and fiducia, about which
there is now general agreement; now for the hypotheca, about
which there is very little. Not that there is any disagreement today
about the growth of the institution itself - ownership and possession of the pledge left to the debtor, with only a possessory interest
in the creditor; on the contrary. Originally such an institution,
stamped with the name hypotheca, was thought to derive its physical as well as its verbal origin from the Greeks, and statements
to such effect may still be found among less careful writers today. 36
31
Sohm-Mitteis 344 n.5.
32
33

Buckland, Text-Book 477; Jrs-Kunkel 154-55.
Buckland, Text-Book 477; Kaser § 38, at 126; Wigmore, supra note 3, 11

Harv.
34 L. Rev. 27-28 & n.2.
For an excellent discussion of the later operation of the rights to sell in

post-classic times, see Levy, Westr5misches Vulgarrecht, Das Obligationrecht,
191-95
3 5 (1956).
Buckland, Text-Book 477; Wigmore, supro,note 3, 11 Harv. L. Rev. 28-29.
36E.g., Burdick, Principles of Roman Law and Their Relation to Modern
Law 381 (1938). Even Buckland hedges in his Manual of Roman Private Law
353 (2d ed. 1939), as to whether the hypotheca was indigenous or borrowed.
The older writers, even Sohm, all declared for a Greek origin. See, e.g., Muir-

head, Hlistorical Introduction to the Private Law of Rome 242 (3d ed. Grant
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But it may now be regarded as confirmed that the institution
developed from indigenous Roman roots, and only the name came
37
from the Greek, though precisely when is hotly disputed.
The pledge without possession first became of importance in
agricultural estates.3 8 So far as the debtor was concerned the
transfer of possession of the average chattel as pledge to the creditor worked no more than a temporary inconvenience. But if the
debtor pledged his land to the creditor, or if he leased land from
the creditor and pledged the goods with which he intended to live
and work upon the land, it was essential that the debtor retain
possession and use of the pledge. "Natiirlich behielt der Pdchter
...den Besitz: wie hittte er sonst wirtschaften soilen!" 39 If the
res in question could be transferred as fiduci to the creditor (i.e.,
the debtor had quiritinary ownership and both creditor and debtor
were Roman citizens), the creditor could still protect his interest
by an actio rei vindicatia. But if the res were transferred as pignus,
then the creditor had neither ownership to found an actio in rem,
nor possession to qualify for a possessory interdict.40 As an initial
aid to the creditor in this conditon, at some point in the republic
the praetor granted him the interdict Savianum, which enabled
him at least to recover the pledged object from the tenant when
the debt remained unpaid. 41 It is uncertain but probable that this
interdict became applicable before late classical times to protect
the creditor's -interest against any third parties in possession of
the pledge ;42 in any event in the late republic or early empire the
praetor created for his benefit an actio in rem, the actio Serviana,
43
which was effective against both the debtor and third parties.
The utility of this actio Serviana naturally commended itself
for wider application than the agricultural tenancy alone. Accord1916) ("imported from Greece, and very alien to Roman legal principles
.. "); Sohm, Institutions of Roman Law 354 (3d ed. Ledlie transl. 1892);
Walton,
Historical Introduction to Roman Law 367 (4th ed. 1920).
37
Buckland, Text-Book 475 n.8; JfSrs-Kunkel 156; Kaser § 110, at 389; Lee,
Elements of Roman Law 177 (4th ed. 1956); Schulz 409; Sohm-Mitteis 344-45;
Rabel,
supra note 6, at 38-39; Wigmore, supra note 3, 11 Harv. L. Rev. 33 n.2.
3
SBuckland, Text-Book 475; J6rs-Kunkel 156-57; Kaser § 38, at 127; Schulz
408;39 Sohm-Mitteis 344-45; Rabel, supra. note 6, at 38-39.
Sohm-Mitteis 344. "The last great achievement of the jus honorarium."
(transl.
supplied by author).
4
OKaser § 111, at 394-95, sharply attacks this view. He believes that even
in republican times the creditor in pignus was regarded as sufficiently possessing an owner's interest to obtain the actie rei vendicatio. The interdict
Sal-vianum, which he dates in the first century B.C., arose because of its advantage in the use of formulary procedure and the avoidance of exact technicalities.
4
iBuckland, Text-Book 475; Jtirs-Kunkel 156-57.
42
jolowicz states that if the interdictum Salvianum was available against
third parties, the actio Serviana probably was a creature of classical times,
but if the creditor had no relief against third parties otherwise the actio Serviana,45must have arisen during the republic. Jolowicz 320.
Schulz 408; of. Kaser § 111, at 395-96.
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ingly when Julianus prepared the Edict of Hadrian, he made the
actio Servian available (perhaps as an innovation, perhaps as a
definitive statement of prior practice) to any creditor who lacked
possession of the pledge: a development truly "die letzte Grosstat
des jus honorarium.' 4 It should be noted that the use of the terms
actio quasi Serviana or actio hypothecaria for this extended use
of the actie Serviana is now believed to be post-classical interpolation. 45 The pledge with possession in the debtor was now thoroughly
established as a functional device in all areas of life. Specifically,
the advantages it afforded in enabling multiple pledges of the same
property, as well as its utility to tenants in rural or urban occupancy, made it indubitably the most popular mode of pledging
46
realty.
In this picture of the evolution of the pledge with possession
in the debtor, all commentators concur. Where they diverge is over
the continued existence of fiducia as a distinct entity, the relationship of fiducia and pignus to this evolving institution and inter se,
and the manner in which the name hypotheca became peculiarly
attached to pledge with possession in the debtor. The definitions
found in the Digest only complicate the matter. Ulpianus: "Proprie pignus dicimus, quod ad creditorem transit, hypothecam, cum
non transitnee possessio ad creditorem." D.13.7.9.2. Pignus is when
possession is transferred to the creditor, hypotheca when it is retained by the debtor. Simple enough. But then contrast Florentinus: "Pignus manente proprietate debitoris solam possessionem
transfert ad creditoren; potest tamen et precario et pro conducto
debitor re sua uti." D.13.7.35.1. This clearly indicates that pignus
might or might not exist with possession in the creditor. Finally
there is the famous maxim of Marcianus: "Inter pignus autem et
hypothecam tantum nominis sonus differt." D.20.1.5.1. So now we
are assured that the only difference between pignus and hypotheca
is one of words!
There are almost as many explications as there are romanists.
Perhaps the closest to the standard older analysis is that proferred
by Buckland. In his view, the pledge with possession in the debtor
grew out of pignus in the manner described above. Hypotheca was
only the Greek name for such a relationship, used in dealings with
Greeks until the days of the Severi, when it began to come into
general use to distinguish the institution from the standard pignus
with possession in the creditor. 47 Fiducia on the other hand continued as a totally independent institution, so that in the empire
44
Sohm-Mitteis
45

345.
Jolowicz 319 n.4; Kaser § 111 n.32; Schulz 408.

46jolowicz 319.
47

Buckland, Text-Book 475 n.8.
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there were three entirely different modes of pledge- fiducia,
pignus and hypotheca. 48 The reason for fiducia's continued survival despite the formalistic manner of its creation lay in its advantages for the creditor. Indeed it is "possible that mancipatio
and cessia in iure were kept in existence for some time because
they could be used for fiducia."49 Presumably Buckland would
argue that fiducia went its separate path until it became so archaic
as to perish, while pignus and hypotheca remained distinct only
insofar as the special characteristics of possession in the debtor
(tacit hypothecation and multiple hypothecation) required. The
thesis is not improbable and cannot be demonstrated as wrong,
though there does seem to be no good reason why fiducia with
possession in the debtor might not also have been a precursor of
hypotheca and, especially after the actio Servina, have tended to
merge with both pignus and hypotheca.50
For Sohm-Mitteis, the significant feature of Roman real security
is the development of a freely alienable pledge without possession,
an abstract creditor's interest based on agreement between the
parties, the besitzloses Vertragspfand. In this analysis, the two
original forms of republican real security were the Verfallpfand
or forfeiture pledge and the Resitzpfand or possession pledge. The
primary form of fiducia, with transfer of ownership but not necessarily possession to the creditor, was the Verfallpfand.5 1 Pignus
in the form of pignoredare was the Besitzpfand. The creditor here
52
had bare possession, with no inherent right to foreclose or sell.
By the empire both forms had evolved into alienable pledges,
the Verkaufspfand. Fiducia now tended to replace the forfeiture
agreement, the lex commissaria, with the agreement for sale, the
pactum vendendo. Nonetheless it was less viable than pignus,
because it labored under two handicaps: the debtor had no right
in rem against third parties, and its use was limited to Roman
citizens because it could only be created by the rather old-fashioned
methods of mancipatio and in iure cessio.53 Pignus in the form of
pignore dare was more practical and satisfactory to both parties.
The debtor had an actio rei vindicatio against anyone in possession, while the creditor had the protection of possessory interdicts
4
8Buckland
49

& McNair, Roman Law and Common Law 314 (1952).
Buckland, Text-Book 474.
5OIn the West in post-classic times, this appears to be what happened. See
Levy, West Roman Vulgar Law 60 & n.231 (1951), and especially Levy, op.
cit. 5supra note 34, at 181-82.
iSohm-Mitteis 342: "dem pactum fiduciae die Verfallklausel (lex cornmissoria)
innewohnte ....
52
Sohm-Mitteis 343: "Das pignus als solches war ein blosses Beschlagspfand
(Arrestpfand)
....
5

3Id. at 342-43.
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and as a matter of practice obtained agreements permitting him
to sell.
But as the emphasis from the creditor's point of view fell increasingly upon the pactum vendendo, the requirement of possession became subordinate: the Besitzpfand turned into a Verkaufspfand, or pledge with right of sale. This form, which SohmMitteis terms pignori obligari, spread in utility through the actio
Servianu, until eventually a truly abstract interest in the res came
to be the sole basis of the pledge, the besitzloses Vertragspfand,
the pure contractual pledge without possession.
"Unter demr Einfluss des steigenden Verkehrs war die
Rdrmische Entwicklung vom Eigentumspfand (Manzipationspfand, Verfallpfand) und Besitzpfand (Traditionspfand, Beschtagspfand) zu der Verkaufspfand (dem Vertragspfand, welches die Sache als Trdger von Geldwert be' '54
handelt) iibergegangen.
It is not clear in this presentation whether fiducia as Verfallpfand
should be deemed to have died out or merged with pignore dare
as the latter gave rise to the Vertragspfand. It is clear that SohmMitteis regards both possession in the creditor, pignore dare, and
possession in the debtor, pignori obligari, as equally available alternative forms of pignus, presumably with the term hypotheca
as a total interpolation in the Corpus Juris Civilis.55
Wigmore's approach is similar, but more detailed. In his theory,
the two original forms of real security were a pledge-mortgage
with possession in the creditor (pignus) and a sale to the creditor
for repurchase by the debtor (fiducia). 56 The pledge-mortgage
with possession in the creditor was primordially a forfeiture
pledge ;57 but by the time of our earliest sources it had developed
into the standard pignus with agreements to forfeit (lex commissoria) or, perhaps implied, to sell (pactur de vendendo). Even
at this time possession need no longer be in the creditor: "The
pledge with pledgor's possession was in existence as far back as
we find pignus at all."58 Pledge-mortgage with possession in the
54
Sohm-Mitteis 346. "Under the influence of increasing commerce, the
Roman law developed from the Eigentumspfand, or pledge in which title is
transferred (the mancipatio or forfeiture pledge), and Besitzpfand, or pledge
in which possession is transferred (the traditia or pledge with distraint), to
the Verkaufspfand, or pledge with right of sale (the Vertragspfand,or purely
contractual pledge, which regarded the res solely as the basis of a monetary
interest). (transl. supplied by author).
551d.
at 344 n.5.
56
Kaser § 38 expresses the same idea: fiducia was a "Kauf mit Ruckkaufs-

vorbehalt . . . wobei der Kaufpreis die Funktion einer Darlehensauzahlung

hatte."
57
Wigmore, The Pledge-Idea.: A Study iu Comparative Legal Ideas, 11
Harv. L. Rev. 18, 25-27 (1897).
55

ld. at 30 n.2.
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debtor was desirable both for contingent liability situations (e.g.,
in favor of the wife's interest in her dos, or the ward's interest
in the property subject to the care of his guardian), and agricultural loans and leases. 59 Later custom, exemplified by the actio
Servina,brought the pledge-mortgage into wider vogue. By classical times Wigmore's thesis is that:
"Pignus was the generic word, used with two different
verbs,- deponere. for creditor's possession, and opponere
for debtor's possession; when the debtor was left in possession, he was said to possess precario, i.e., on a lease at
will of the creditor. And pignu s was applicable to land as
well as to personalty. In post-classic times, pignus did indeed become ordinarily applied to personalty, and specifically to personalty handed into the creditor's possession
(like the English "pledge"). For realty retained by the
debtor, the more common word, apparently became hypotheca. ... ."60
Sale for repurchase (fiducia) Wigmore views in its origin as
essentially a conditional sale, "almost identical, in form and spirit,
with the original English 'trust'." 61 The creditor usually had possession of the res with title thereto, but only on condition of reconveyance; meanwhile he bore the risk of loss, but could retain
the full res (at least, in later days, via a lex commissoria) on nonpayment. This power of forfeiture, intrinsic to the fiducia, constituted its advantage to the creditor. For the debtor its advantage
lay in its greater privacy than the more forthright pignus, and in
62
the commonly longer term of his right to recover by repurchase.
But for reasons Wigmore never fully explains fiducia tended to
blend into pignus (presumably pignore opponere) :
"By the end of the classical period the fiducia seems to have
been brought under all the rules of pledge, so far as they
prevented the pledgee from getting any special benefit from
using that form ... and the phrase 'pignus vel fiducia,"as
including the two typical forms, is common."63
What happened to the term fiduci? Well, fiducia had always
been the preferred usage for realty security. Once it had been
denatured into a pure security interest of the creditor, its status
59 Wigmore, The Pledge-Mortgage Idea in Roman Law: A Revolutionary
Interpretation,
36 Ill.
L. Rev. 371, 376 (1941).
60
1d. at 379.
6i1d. at 380. The analogy is also discussed by Erbe, Die Fiduzia in R6mischen
Recht 3-4 (1940).
62
Wigmore, supra.note 59, at 377.
6
3Wigmore, supra note 57, at 32 n.2.
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was the same as the Greek institution of hypotheca. 4 This is the
basis of Wigmore's interpolation theory:
"The Greek Constantinopolitan Compilers, accustomed to
the Greek term hypotheke, and finding that the fiducia corresponded to it in legal effect, saw fit to substitute the word
'hypotheca' for the word 'fiducia' in every passage of the
classicaljurists selected for the Digest."' 5
His chief substantiation is the fact that independent manuscripts
and fragments in the West, especially those surviving of Gaius and
Paulus, seem to know fiducia, but not hypothec, and subsume all
real security forms under pignus vel fiducia instead of the Digest
phrase of pignus vel hypotheca 6
Both Wigmore and Sohm-Mitteis make a valuable contribution
with their insistence that possession in the creditor and possession
in the debtor were always equally valid types of pignus. This theory of the generic nature of pignus has been adopted by the other7
major authorities today.
But Wigmore's theory of the absorption of fiduci by pignus.
and the subsequent wholesale interpolation of hypotheca for pignus.
is quite subject to question. True, fiducia with possession in the
debtor, just as well as pignus with possession in the debtor, could,
have been the form of agricultural tenure which prompted theinterdictum Salvianum and actio Servina, and hence the institution later known as hypotheca. But why should this require that
fiducia be deemed to have first abandoned its peculiar nature forabsorption into the different one of pignus, yet continued as a.
functional synonym applied to pignus of realty until suddenly a
wholesale one-for-one replacement of the word by hypotheca took
place?
Fiducia in its original form gave total ownership rights to the
creditor, only a personal actio fiduciae to the debtor. This ownership was absolute, not conditional: the idea of a condition was
inimical to the Roman conception of the transfer which occurred:
by means of mancipatio or in iure cessio.68 If Wigmore is right,.
then in classical times, even among the great and extremely careful
commentators, the name fiducia (as synonymous with pignus) was.
applied to an institution the very antithesis of its original sense-64

Wigmore, supra note 59, at 385.
651d. at 381.
661d. at 382-83. That much is certainly correct. Levy, op. cit. supra note.
34 at 181-82, observes that in the West the generic term "obligare rein' was.

preferred,
and fiducia degenerated into a casual reference to any pledge.
7

6 Jolowicz 319-20; Jirs-Kunkel 156; Kaser § 108, at 385; Schulz 409; Rabel,,

Real Securities in Roman Law, 1 Seminar 32, 38 (1943).
68Rabel, supra note 67, at 40.
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with ownership left in the debtor, no a ctio fiduciae, and the creditor the possessor merely of an abstract interest. This is not impossible, but has certain elements of improbability about it.
Another question: what happened to the requirement of transfer by mancipatio or cessio in iure? Wigmore suggests that simple
traditio eventually sufficed,6 9 but as Rabel notes, even the latest
references to fiducia indicate the continuing utilization of mancipatio and cessio in iure. Of course, this may have only been a
legal fiction, with the statement in writing of the occurrence of a
mancipatia or cessio in iure creating an irrebutable presumption
that such in fact occurred, even though really non-existent. 70 But
this is rather an awkward way of preserving the forms of fiducia
if, as is admitted, the form of pignus with possession in the debtor
would have done as well.
As sale for repurchase, fiducia, had practical advantages for
the creditor: an ownership interest easily protected, and forfeiture
rights. When these disappeared, why should the creditors, in the
classical period, have bothered to retain the old name and principles of fiducia when the functional form had been effectually
merged with pignori opponeri? All in all, Buckland's view, discussed above, that fiducia retained its" inherent attributes down
through classical times precisely because of the advantages for the
creditor seem at least as probable.
What happened in post-classic times, at least in the vulgar law
of the West, is easier to discern. Fiducia as a distinct institution,
with transfer of ownership through mncipatio or in iure cessio,
cannot at the very latest have survived longer than the 4th or early
5th centuries, disappearing along with the mancipatio and in lure
cessio themselves. 71 Later than that any use of the word fiducia is
sound without substance.7 2 Levy's careful culling of recent research establishes that the more careless Western writers, unlike
their more academic brethren in Beirut and Byzantium, commonly
and casually used fiduci as a term for pledge regardless of any
transfer of ownership or possession.7 3 The term had degenerated
into a generic one for pledge, to be teamed with pignus, without
any particular distinction being drawn between them. In any
event, the popular term was neither fiducia nor pignus, but obli-

gare rem."
69
Levy, op. cit. supra note 34, at 184, may also be cited as doubtful that
traditio ever substituted for mancipatio or in iure cessio in any form of fiducia. In his opinion, when these died out, there was no form of true fiducia
as a0 "Sicherrungsubereignung."
7 Id. at 41-43.
7'Erbe,
op. cit. supra note 61, at 204.
72

1d. at 204-06.

73 Levy, op. cit. supra note 34, at 181-84.
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This freehanded use of the fiduci in the West in post-classic
times is not surprising in view of the rather low ebb of legal scholarship. But such usage in post-classic times affords no aid in any
attempted demonstration that fiduci as a transfer of ownership
disappeared in the classic period and that the term instead was
applied to the pledge without possession, as Wigmore would have
it. Still less does it offer any clue as to how the term hypotheca
arose, and the extent to which it was interpolated for either fiducia
or pignus.
Indeed, the theory of wholesale interpolation that Fehr and
Wigmore propound is even more vulnerable. If fiducia tended to
be amalgamated with pignus, as Wigmore argues, why should not
pignus also have been interpolated for fiducia.? The work of Lenel
and other scholarly interpolation studies point to precisely such
interpolation of pignus for fiducia in some areas.74 Further, granted that in other passages hypotheca was often interpolated for fiducia, there is no compelling cause to believe in a wholesale transposition by the Tribonian commission in preparing the Corpus
Juris Civilis, instead of a gradual replacement over the fourth and
fifth centuries by the professors at Beirut and Byzantium. Finally, it appears quite probable that hypotheca as a term for pledge
with possession in the debtor had gained currency in classical
times, drawn from Greek sources 75 or from usage in Greek-influenced south Italy,7 6 and was so used by classical authors. 7 With
all these alternatives, in our present state of knowledge, as Rabel
concludes, "there is no way of knowing, when we read either pignus
or hypotheca in the Digest, what the original object of the passage
was, unless we begin an exegesis with a more or less questionable
7
principle as basis.
In any event, we can at least intelligibly appreciate the import
of the definitions of Ulpianus, Florentinus and Marcianus cited
above. Ulpianus indicates the preference in usage for hypotheca
to cover pledge with possession in the debtor and pignus for pledge
with possession in the creditor; Florentinus demonstrates that pignus as well as hypotheca could in fact be used to designate possession left in the debtor; and Marcianus rightly avers accordingly
74
Lenel, Quellenforschungen in den Edictcommentaren 1: Zur actio fiducia,
Zeitschreft der Savigny-Stiftung, III Rom. Abt. 104-20, 177-80 (1882). Cf.
Schulz
407.
75
Buckland, Text-Book 475 n.8 and Kaser § 110, at 389, suggest the word
hypotheca was first used in the provinces, then adopted in a monograph by
Gaius on provincial edicts or by a later writer in a new edition of such a
monograph. Other than this suggestion, Kaser believes the issue to be "em
ungel6stes
RPtsel."
76
Rabel, supra note 67, at 39.
77
J~irs-Kunkel 156 n.3. This footnote cites the major continental criticisms
of Fehr's
Justinian interpolation thesis.
78

Rabel, supra note 67, at 45.
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that there was only one pledge type in classical times, indifferently
known as pignus or hypotheca. Altogether, perhaps the best critical summary of the evolution in Roman terminology is that of
Jrs-Kunkel:
" [Pignus] ist zweifelos die ursprilnglichke Terminologie; sie
beweist, dass die Rmer beide Pfandarten trotz der verschiedenen Besitzlage nicht als wesensverschieden behandeiten.
Erst spd'terhin, immerhin wohk noch in kiassischer Zeit,
begann,man das besitzlose Pfand in dusserlicherAnlehnung
an den griechischen Sprachgebrauch kypotheca zu nennen
und dem Faustpfand [i.e., pledge with possession] gelegentlich gegeniiberzustellen. Die nach klassische Zeit zeigt dann
eine entschiedene Vorliebe fur den griechisehen Ausdruck:
an vielen Stellen der justinianischen Gesetzgebung ist das
Wort kypotheca nachklassische Zutat, zumeist als Sondername filr da besitzlose Pfand, gelegentlic. aber auch als
79
Bezeicknung fiir beide Pfandarten."
II.

A NEUTRAL PRESENTATION

OF THE LAW OF ROMAN REAL SECURITY

0

One major conclusion can be drawn from the historical analysis
above: that Roman law in both its classical and post-classical eras
knew only one basic form of real security. Whether this form was
known as pignus or hypotheca or both, or whether preferred usage
required pignus to indicate possession in the creditor and hypotheca (fiducia?) to indicate possession in the debtor, is a topic
really of fairly minor importance. Substance, not nomenclature, is
the only matter of significance. Admittedly, there were special
legal doctrines occasioned by the fact of possession in the creditor
(e.g., duty of care of the pledge) or in the debtor (e.g., the possibility of tacit and multiple pledges). But these individual legal
rules were fact-incited and fact-oriented, not the result of theoretical distinctions between disparate legal institutions.
Accordingly, it is quite inappropriate to speak of the legal rules
of pignus or the legal rules of kypotheca as such. 8 1 It is preferable
79Jrs-Kunkel 156. "[Pignus] is undoubtedly the original terminology; it
indicates that the Romans did not regard the two forms of pledge as essentially different even despite the different modes of possession. Only later,
although still in the classic period, did they begin to call the pledge without
possession hypotheca, following the Greek terminology, and to use it on occasion in contrast to the pledge with possession. The post-classic age manifests
a definite preference for the Greek expression: in many passages of the
Justinian legislation the word hypothect is an interpolation, most often for
the possessionless pledge, but occasionally also as the description for both
types of pledge." (transl. supplied by the author).
S0 The most neutral and comprehensive treatments are to be found in J~rsKunkel, Kaser and Schulz.
siIn subsequent presentation, the term hypothecation will be used to de-
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to adopt a neutral terminology and present the doctrines applicable
to pledge as a whole, organized in categories strictly according to
the basic factual situations which engender these doctrines. The
second part of this article shall strive to present such a neutral
analysis of Roman real security as manifested basically in its classical period. The topics presented in order are: mode of creation
and subject matter of pledge; respective rights and duties when
the creditor has possession; the creditor's right to foreclose, buy,
or sell; the creditor's rights against third parties; the debtor's
rights against the creditor or third parties; general and tacit
pledges; rights of multiple creditors inter se; priorities among multiple pledges; modes of extinction of pledges.
Whether fiduci in classical times had merged with the generic
pledge type, or remained independent, undoubtedly in republican
Rome it existed as a distinct mode of real security whose essence
centered on the transfer of ownership to the creditor. But reconstruction of the legal doctrines that governed fiducia,at this time,
aside from the basic features described above in the historical
analysis, is a problematical undertaking at best and far beyond the
capacities of a neophyte.8 2 Therefore, only casual reference will
be made to probable rules of fiducia where such would be germane
in the consideration of the general Roman pledge type.
A.

Mode of Creation and Subject Matter

Creation.- Fiducia of course required transfer of the property under the full formalities of mancipatio and cessio in iure.
But in the creation of the normal pledge no formalities whatsoever
were required. As Gaius states, a pledge was constituted by any
informal agreement, "contrahitur hypothec. per pactum conven.turn," and a writing was of utility only in proof. D.20.1.4. Ulpianus
declares that mere agreement sufficed, and delivery was unnecessary: "Pignus contrahiturnon sola traditione, sed etiam nuda conventione, etsi non traditum est." D.13.7.1. However, some agreement on the part of the debtor was necessary. Papinianus posits
the case of a friend of an absent debtor who pays the creditor (not
at a purchase sale, which would give the friend title). The pledge
was deemed released, not transferred to the friend - although if
he took possession, he could defend with an exceptio any action
brought for its recovery by the debtor until the debt was paid.
D.20.6.1.pr.
scribe the process of creating a pledge, especially if without possession (as in
multiple pledges), since such is the common usage today. Purely as shorthand
reference, the word pignus may occasionally be used to indicate possession in
the 82
creditor, and hypotheca possession in the debtor.
The most thorough-going treatment of fiducia, though by no means free
of polemic, is Erbe, op. cit. supra note 61, at 12-121.
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Conditional creation of a pledge subject to a specified event was
quite possible. No liability occurred until the event happened.
D.20.1.13.5. An inter vivos creation was not essential- the praetor would honor any hypothecation by will. D.13.7.26. The limited
Roman conception of agency resulted in an interesting fiction. A
debtor could obligate himself via a slave or a filius familia-s, but
not via a freeman even if he were a managing agent or guardian.
D.13.7.11.6.83 But a freeman, in fact an agent, could give the pledge
as for himself, and thereafter could sue as though owner if necessary to recover it. D.13.7.11.7. All in all, just about any caus. for a
pledge or mode of creation was possible. As Marcianus summarizes:
".. . property can be hypothecated for any kind of an obligation whatsoever where money is lent, a dowry bestowed, a
purchase or sale made, a leasing and hiring concluded, or a
mandate given; also where the obligation is absolute, or
where it is for a certain time, or under some condition, or
where it is assumed in pursuance of an agreement, or to
secure a present indebtedness, or one previously contracted." D.20.1.5.pr.
Physical subject matter.- For pledge, praetorian or bonitary
4
ownership- that protected by an actio Publiciana.-sufficed.
D.20.1.18. Indeed, the debtor need not be owner at all. Property
of a third party could be pledged if the latter consented. D.13.7.20.
Absent consent of course no pledge could result8 5 Once a pledge
arises on physical property, it is not affected by a change in the
external character of the property, as the planting of a vineyard
on former pasture land, or building a house on farmland.
D.20.1.16.2. 8 6 But a general obligation (obligatio generalis rerum)
covering all property which the debtor now has or may hereafter
have does not include such things which one normally would not
give in pledge, as clothing, household goods, and essential domestic
slaves, D.20.1.6, or articles in daily use, D.20.1.7, or a laborer's tools
necessary to earning his livelihood in cultivating land,
C.8.16(17).8, or a concubine, natural children and apprentices.
83The Digest fragment, visibly interpolated, evidences some hesitation in
reaching this conclusion in view of the admitted ability of a freeman to acquire4 possession of a res as agent for another.
8 Quiritinary ownership was of course essential for fiducia.
85 Pomponius indicates that technical rules as to when title passes may be
decisive here. D pledges property to A, then sells it to B, borrowing the money
from C to pay A and release the initial pledge. Even though D promised to
repledge to C, the property is deemed to have already passed to B. Digest
13.7.2 [hereinafter cited as D.].
86Cf. the illustration given by Paulus in D.20.1.29.2: A house given in
pledge burns. The bona fide purchaser of the land builds a new house. The
creditor's pledge remains on the new house (!), although the creditor must
pay the cost of the materials.
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D.20.1.8. The creditor has the burden of proof if there is an issue
as to whether a specific item was intended to be among the articles
pledged. D.20.1.15.1.
Intangible subject matter.- The utilization of intangible interests as subject matter argues a certain sophistication of the
concept of pledge. The Romans arrived at such a stage, probably
in early classic times, by the application of the principle that any
interest that could be the subject of a sale could also be the subject
of a pledge- in Gaius' phrase (quite possibly originally referring
to fiducia), "Quod emptionem venditionemque recipit, etiam pignerationem recipere potest." D.20.1.9. Probably the initial intangible
subject was a future expectation of physical property, as an increase of flocks, crops or fruit. D.20.1.15.pr. (Gaius). Paulus indicates a progress in the concept occurring under praetorian auspices.
Thus a debt could be pledged, but only if the praetor will honor the
agreement, D.13.7.18.pr., and land subject to a vectigalis (perpetual lease) or to a superficies could be pledged "quia, hodie utiles
actiones superficiariisdantur." D.13.7.16.2.
A usufructus could be pledged, D.20.1.11.2, but the Roman incapability of conceiving of a servitude in gross resulted in a peculiar distinction: a rural servitude could be pledged, but only to a
neighboring landowner who could make use of it (presumably
under a lex commissoria), D.20.1.12, but an urban servitude could
not. D.20.1.11.3. But the Romans were willing to recognize a pledge
on the continuously changing inventory of a store, a so-called
pledge on floating stock in trade, D.20.1.34.pr., which even today is
recognized by the common law but not usually by the civil law. A
pledge of a pledge, or subpledge, was also possible. But unlike our
law, which regards such a subpledge as purely one of the creditor's
intangible interest, the Romans tended to treat it as a second
pledge on the res itself.8 7 Thus, if the debtor paid the initial creditor, the secondary creditor lost all his rights in rem, D.13.7.40.2;
D.20.1.13.2. But if (at least in the empire after Gordian) the secondary creditor exercised his right of sale, the debtor's interest in
rem as well as that of the initial creditor was extinguished.
C.8.23 (24) .1.
Matter not subject to pledge. - Property which the debtor has
already sold cannot be pledged by him, even if the sale occurs between the agreement for a pledge and the receipt of the loan from
8
the creditor.A
D.20.3.4. Obviously a res extra. commercium could
87
Buckland
88

& McNair, Roman Law and Common Law 319 (1952).
But an after-acquired title rule was known. If the debtor pledged land
not his own, and later became owner, although an action in pledge was not
available, a praetorian action in analogy to pledge could bring relief. Code
8.15 (16).5 [hereinafter cited as C.].
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not be pledged, D.20.3.1.2; C.8.16(17) .3 (private tomb) ;
C.8.16 (17).5 (prizes in an athletic contest) ; nor could a freeman.
C.8.16(17).6. A ward could not pledge his property without the
consent of his guardian, D.20.3.1.pr., nor could a filius familias or
a slave pledge his peculium without consent (even if the son was
over 25, if he was not yet emancipated). D.20.3.1.1; C.8.15 (16).4.
B.

Mutual Rights and Duties When Possession is in the Creditor

It should be noted initially that the law applicable to the status
of a creditor in possession was not strictly limited to those situations in which possession was deliberately transferred to the creditor as part of the agreement (standard pignus). It applied indifferently as well to situations where the creditor later by any means
or for any limited period of time came into possession, even if
initially it had been agreed that possession should be in the debtor
(standard hypotheca).89 No label, only the fact of possession determined most of these rights and duties.
Duty of care. - Whatever may have been the benefits he obtained otherwise, the creditor in possession was held to quite a
strict standard of care. Essentially he was liable for dolus or culpa,
but not for injury resulting from vis major. D.13.7.13.1. He was
required to exercise great care, exacta diligentia, Inst.3.14.4, 90 and
was liable even for the slightest negligence, culpa levis, D.13.6.5.2.
Paulus presents the standard of care as that of the prudent pater
familias, "Ea igitur, quae diligens pater familias in suis rebus
praestare solet, a creditore exiguntur," D.13.7.14, a formula with
quite a modern ring to it. Conversely, the debtor was obliged not
to do anything which diminished the security of the creditor, e.g.,
the debtor could not wantonly injure a slave pledged to the creditor. D.20.1.27.
Expenses and profits. - Here clearly the benefits tend to lie all
with the creditor. Any significant natural increase in value of the
res is deemed to accrue to the res and remain subject to the pledge,
e.g., increase of flocks when the flocks are pledged, D.20.1.13.pr.,
alluvia when the adjacent land is pledged, D.20.1.16.pr., and the
later acquired usufruct when the basic ownership (nuda. proprietas) of land is pledged, D.13.7.18.1. But any incidental advantages
or disadvantages will accrue to the debtor, D.20.1.21.2, who will
either enjoy them on return of the object, or in the event of a sale
at least benefit from an increased hyperocha or a decreased religuum. Thus where there is a loss to the value of the pledge due
to its temporary taking by the state for public use, on redemption
89

Cf. Jdrs-Kunkel 158.
9°Citations to the Institutes of Justinian are to Institutes of Justinian
(7th ed. Sandars transl. 1922).
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the creditor is not liable, and the debtor must bear the loss.
D.13.7.43.1; C.8.13(13.6) (highway repairs). Where the creditor
has made any improvements in the res, he can recover the expense
for such improvements from the debtor. P.2.13.7.91 The canny
Roman sense of equity, however, intervened to modify this rule
where major improvements were made by the creditor with an eye
to thwarting the debtor from recovering the res by making the repayment price prohibitive. In such a case the debtor need not pay
the costs of the improvements. D.13.7.25.
Creditor's possessory rights.- A creditor in possession could
always bring an action for theft (furtum) against anyone who
stole the property, even if it were the debtor-owner. G.3.200, 204.92
This rule probably originated when the creditor was owner, in fiducia,93 but it was later clearly recognized that any person having a
possessory interest in the object could bring an action of furtum.
G.3.203. The creditor could lease the object pledged to third parties, D.20.1.23, or back to the debtor, D.13.7.37. He could also
pledge it to his own creditor. D.13.7.40.2.
Two somewhat unusual rules gave the creditor a right to retain
the pledge until the total debt was paid, or a totally unconnected
debt was paid. The first rule was that of pignoris causa indivisa
est. Should the debtor have pledged several articles, he has no right
to return of some of them on part payment; should co-owners
pledge property, payment of his share of the debt by one leaves the
interest he has in the full estate still encumbered; when heirs divide an estate pledged, the total encumbrance of the pledge falls
on each share.9 4 C.8.30 (31).1; C.8.31 (32).1, 2. At least after the
emperor Gordian, and probably earlier in classical times, 95 the
curious rule prevailed that even after the debtor paid the debt
secured by the pledge, the creditor had a jus retentionis to hold the
object until a totally unrelated debt was paid. C.8.26 (27) .1.2. This
OlCitations to Paulus, Sententiae, are to 1 Scott, The Civil Law (1932).
Section 2.13 of the Sententiae, De Lex Commissoria, is believed originally to
have
92 concerned fiducia. Cf. Buckland, Text-Book 474 n.6.

Citations to the Institutes of Gaius are to Poste, Gai Institutiones Juris

Civilis
4th ed. Whittuck 1904).
93
Not only could an owner steal his own property from the creditor, he
could regain full bonitary title by usucapio for a year. Gaius Inst.2.59 [hereinafter cited as G.3. Obviously, usucapio was not possible if the debtor was

in possession by precario or lease, but if the debtor's possession was not with

the consent of the creditor, usucapio could be achieved. In such a case the

usucapio was not bona fide, i.e., was lucrativa usucapio, but nonetheless effectual.
G.2.60.
9
4See Schulz 421-23, for an excellent series of illustrations of the causac in-

divioa rule. Whether the causa indivisa. idea existed in classic times is, however,
not free from doubt. See Kaser § 110, at 390 n.17.
95
Buckland, Main Institutions of Roman Private Law 322 (1931). Weiss,
Pfandrechtiche Untersuchungen 51-52 (1909), sees this rule as a consequence

of influence from similar Greek institutions.
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jus retentioniswas not however a continued pledge interest in rem.
Though the creditor could defend an actio brought for its possession
by the debtor with an exceptio, he could not prevent further hypothecation of the re&to other creditors" nor did he enjoy the right
to sell the res to satisfy the unsecured debt.9 7
Actions and interdicts.- The basic remedy of the debtor not
in possession against the creditor was the actia pigneraticia directa, to recover the pledge on repayment or to recover damages
for injury to the pledge or misconduct with it. This actio was available even if the debt was not paid, so long as the money for payment was tendered at the time of the preparation of the formula
before the praetor, D.13.7.9.5, and it was available on full payment
of the debt even if the pledge had originally been given on an agreement of antichresis (see infra). D.13.7.33. On the other hand, the
creditor had a reciprocal actio pigneraticia contraria which was
available to recover necessary expenses occurring on account of the
pledge, D.13.7.8, or to recover damages should be the debtor have
deceitfully pledged property belonging to another, or otherwise
acted in bad faith with regard to the pledge, D.13.7.9.
The creditor had the benefit of possessory interdicts against
wrongful disturbance of his possession by third parties: unde vi,
where he has been forcibly deprived of the pledge, D.43.16.1.9;
utrubi, to protect against the loss of, or to recover, movables,
D.43.3.1.1; and uti possidentis, to protect against interference or
loss of immovables, D.43.17.2 (not available if the debtor in fact
remains in possession, while the creditor has only technical possession, as under a lease, D.43.17.3.8).
Antichresis. - Generally a creditor had no right to use, exploit,
or take any profit from the res. So strongly was this principle felt
that in the case of chattels, for a creditor to make use of the res
was theft. D.47.2.55 (54).pr. But especially in the case of a pledge
of land, it was not uncommon to agree that the creditor should take
the fruits of the land in lieu of interest until the principal sum was
repaid. D.20.1.11.1; C.4.32.17. Even in the absence of express
agreement some retention of profits to be applied pro tanto could
be implied, e.g., if a pledge was made of a slave over whom the
creditor took possession, Paulus states that anything acquired
through the industry of the slave should go to offset the principal.
P.2.13.2. Indeed, if there was no agreemnt whatsoever regarding
the payment of interest by the debtor, the creditor enjoyed a tacit
96
Buckland,
97

op. cit. supra note 95.
Jrs-Kunkel 155: "Hierin lag aber nur ein Zurfickbehaltungsrecht, kein
eigentliches Pfandrecht."
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antichresis to all profits from the pledge up to the legal rate of
interest. P.2.5.2; D.20.2.8.
C.

Creditor'sRight to Foreclose,Buy or Sell

Right to foreclose or buy. - Whether or not there ever was a
period in which the creditor could simply declare the pledge forfeit
on failure of repayment,9 8 Roman law in the republican and classical period did recognize a right to contract for forfeiture, the lex
commissori. D.20.1.16.9. Employment of such a clause when the
res considerably exceeded the value of the debt gave rise to serious
abuse. The use of the lex commissoria was accordingly finally
abolished by Constantine. C.8.34(35).3. Thereafter the only way
in which the pledge could be forfeited to the creditor was upon petition to the governor, the impetratio dominii. This was allowed
when the creditor found himself unable to sell the pledge, and the
debtor upon repeated notice did not avail himself of the opportunity to repay. The governor would then permit the creditor to
take title, but even then, under Justinian's elaborate scheme, the
debtor had two years in which to redeem before the creditor's title
should become indefeasible. C.8.33 (34).3.3.
The issue whether the creditor should be able to buy from the
debtor is closely related to that of forfeiture. Obviously, if the
creditor could buy from the debtor at the time the debt fell due,
exerting the weight of his superior position, something akin to
forfeiture might result, even though there had been no lex conmissoria initially in the agreement. It is not surprising, therefore,
to find the rule strictly laid down by Paulus that the creditor could
not himself buy the pledge from the debtor, P.2.13.3, nor could he
do so via an agent or straw man, per interpositam personarn.
P.2.13.4. However, later we find Marcellus citing a case in which
the creditor's purchase was upheld, apparently on estoppel grounds,
indicating a weakening of the rule.9 9 Finally there is a blunt statement by Tryphonius, citing a rescript of Papinianus to the effect
that the creditor can purchase the pledge from the debtor because
the debtor is the owner. D.20.5.12.pr. Whether this indicates a new
rule in favor of alienability to the creditor, or the reference was to
a special case (perhaps with prior agreement), or a power of purchase upon application to state authority analagous to impetratio
dominii is uncertain.
Evolution of right of sale. 9
8See
9

The law as to the creditor's right

text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
8 The illustration given by Marcellus is one in which the creditor is about
to sell the pledge for non-payment. The debtor requests the creditor to purchase it himself, and after the agreement of purchase writes a letter intimating that he has sold . the cxiaiior. The debtor cannot later revoke this sale
by tendering the princI a
lDrt-rest. D.13.7.34.
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to sell passed through three stages: first, the creditor could only
sell if an express agreement permitted; then, an agreement to sell
was always implied unless contradicted; and finally, the right to
sell became absolute, notwithstanding contrary agreements. It is
probable that the creditor had no right to sell in republican and
early classical times absent agreement, for we have a statement
by Labeo implying sale was by agreement only, D.20.1.35, and one
by Javolenus holding a creditor who sold without agreement or before maturity a thief. D.47.2.74(75).100 In this early period even
the notice of an intended sale by the creditor, done for the purpose
of injuring the debtor's credit, was a tort. D.47.10.15.32.
By mid-classical times, however, the right of sale had clearly
become an implied one, effective in absence of contrary agreement.
D.13.7.4 (Ulpianus) ; P.2.5.1.101 Quite possibly this implied power
of sale, which Buckland describes as "obviously desirable, but quite
anomalous," especially where the creditor was not in possession,
came from fiduci, where it fitted in perfectly with the idea of
ownership in the creditor. 0 2 In any event, it became the accepted
way in which the creditor should realize his security interest, especially after the abolition of the lex commissoria. C.8.27(28).9;
C.8.27 (28).14. Ultimately, the power of sale was so well founded
that even in the face of agreement to the contrary, the creditor
could give notice to the debtor, and on his failure to redeem, sell.
P.2.13.5. The whole evolution may be noted in brief in a passage
by Ulpianus, declaring that a pledge can be sold (a) if the debtor
expressly agrees (original idea), (b) provided no agreement was
entered into preventing it (basic second stage), (c) but even if
there exists an agreement against sale, the creditor may sell without liability for theft upon giving the debtor the three notices
required by law (final absolute right, quqite possibly interpolated).
D.13.7.4.
Incidents of the right to sell. - The right of sale was always
contingent upon the giving of notice to the debtor, that he might
redeem in time if he could. This was set at a threefold notification
0 3
to the debtor, P.2.5.1, probably in the early post-classic period.,
The notice system was periodically modifed by imperial order
through the years, until it culminated in Justinian's elaborate system. According to this, upon maturity of the debt, the creditor
should give notice to the debtor of his intention to sell. Two years
must then pass before the creditor could sell; if he could find no
3001n addition, references to agreements of sale by Gaius in the Institutes
probably originally referred to express and not implied agreements. G.2.64;
Inst.2.8.1.
0
'o
See Kaser § 111, at 394 & n.9.
' 00 32Buckland, op. cit. supr&note 95, at 323.
See Kaser § 111, at 394 n.9.
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buyers, he must give further notice to the debtor and wait an additional two years before it would be possible to declare the res forfeited, and even then the debtor would have two final years to redeem. C.8.33 (34) .3.
The requirement of notice, however, was virtually the only limit
on the creditor's right of sale. True, if the agreement called for
time payments by the debtor, the creditor could not sell immediately upon delinquency in one of the payments, but even this could be
evaded by an agreement permitting such sale in writing. D.13.7.8.3.
The creditor could sell on maturity even if a substantial portion
of the debt had been paid, C.8.27 (28).6, and he could sell for failure to pay interest or the cost of improvements as well as for principal. D.13.7.8.5. A purchaser from the creditor of the pledge prior
to maturity had the same right of sale as the creditor. C.4.10.7.
When a subsequent creditor purchased the interest of the first
creditor, he could sell and keep the proceeds not only for his own
debt, but also for that of the first creditor. D.20.5.5.pr.
There seems to have been some dispute over whether the debtor
could compel the creditor to sell. The question becomes of some
urgency to the debtor if he is unable to pay, yet the res is worth
considerably more than the debt. If the creditor could remain in
possession indefinitely, he might be able to compel the debtor to
accept forfeiture on disadvantageous terms. An early opinion by
Atilicinus was to the effect that the creditor must sell if the debtor
was insolvent. Pomponius cites and rejects this view in favor of
one that noted a power in the debtor himself to sell, tendering the
amount of the debt to the creditor out of the proceeds, thus forcing
the creditor to release the pledge. D.13.7.6.
One other item worthy of note is the rule that if the sale is
rescinded, the ownership of the debtor revives. D.20.6.10.pr. This
common-sense doctrine of course prevents fraudulent dummy, sales.
Similarly, to prevent fraud upon the creditor, the debtor could not
buy the res, and if he did so (presumably through a straw man)
for less than the full value of the debt, the creditor could reclaim
possession until the full debt was paid. D.13.7.40.pr.
Proceeds of the sale. - It goes almost without saying that if the
sale does not realize the full amount of the debt, plus interest and
expenses, the creditor had a personal action against the debtor for
the deficiency. C.8.27(28).3. In the event of such deficiency, the
proceeds were first to be applied to the interest and the expenses,
and only thereafter to the principal, regardless of the debtor's
wishes in the matter. D.13.7.35.pr.
If there were any surplus from the sale, probably originally
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the creditor could retain it, on analogy to the forfeiture pledge. But
during the classical period, there is no doubt of the absolute right
of the debtor to any excess over the debt. D.13.7.24.2. The debtor
had an action to recover the surplus, P.2.13.1, and the creditor's
liability to pay was a personal one, not transferable to the purchaser of the res. D.13.7.42. Of course, if there were other creditors on the same pledge, the first creditor selling would pay the
excess first over to such creditors, and then the surplus if any to
the debtor. C.8.33 (34) .3.4. It appears that the debtor could agree
in advance to yield his right to the surplus. C.8.27(28).20. Such
an agreement was open to the same objections as the lex commissoria,and was certainly not possible under Justinian's sale legislation, if not before. C.8.33 (34).3.4,5.
D.

Creditor'sRights against Third Parties

Aetio Serviana.°4 --That the interdictum Salvianum eventually
afforded a creditor (at least in agricultural tenure situations)
protection against third parties is undoubted, D.43.33.1 (Julianus),
but the time of this extension of application is unknown. 10 5 In any
event, it was to the more satisfactory action in rem of the actio
Serviana that creditors commonly resorted when not in possession
(if in possession, the possessory interdicts would suffice). Inst.
4.6.7; C.8.9.1. It should be noted that the action was available
whenever the creditor was out of possession: it was immaterial
whether this was by the initial agreement (hypotheca), or occurred
after possession was first reposed in the creditor (pignus).' °6
Inst.4.6.7.
The actio Serviana was available whenever the actio Publiciana
would protect the basic ownership involved, i.e., even for bonitary
ownership. D.20.1.18. Although an acti&in rem, it did not guarantee the return of the specific res from the third party, who had
the right to pay the creditor the amount of the debt and retain the
res. D.20.6.12.1. When the pledge was made simultaneously to
several creditors, each could use the actie Serviana against third
parties. D.20.1.10. If the pledge was given to successive creditors,
a subsequent one might employ the actio against third parties, but
i 04 For the probable historical background of the actio Serviana, see text
accompanying
note 43 supra.
i 05 J6rs-Kunkel 157, declares that the extension occurred only in Justinian
times, but Jolowicz 320, is less certain and suggests the extension may have
been as early as republican times. A rescript of Gordian, C.8.9.1, appears to
indicate that under that emperor the Salvianum was limited to proceedings
by the creditor against the debtor or lessees. Note should again be made of
Kaser's view that the creditor had the aetio rei vindicatia,even before the
interdict Salvianum~ Kaser § 111, at 394-95.
loI6Jrs-Kunkel 158.
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must yield possession in turn to the prior creditor if requested.
I
D.20.4.12.pr.
A sensible solution was found to the res judicata effect of prior
suits by the debtor against the third party. If the debtor sues for
property already the subject of a pledge and loses, the creditor is
not barred from bringing the actio Servina, provided he proves
the re was in the hands of the debtor at the time the agreement
of pledge was made. D.20.1.3.pr. (Papinianus). But if the debtor
sues to recover property and loses, and only thereafter pledges
that property to the creditor, the creditor is barred from further
suit -"non
plus habere creditor potest, quam habet qui pignus
dedit." D.20.1.3.1.
The creditor was also held to an election of remedies. When
he chose to proceed with an actio Serviana against the third party,
and recovered damages, he was thereafter barred from proceeding in personam against the debtor. D.20.6.8.19. Justinian effectively eliminated this election by compelling the creditor to resort
to his personal action against the debtor first, and only if he failed
to recover all that was due him there, to proceed against third
07
parties. Nov.4.2.
Even if the third party acquired possession via a sale by
the debtor (without the creditor's consent), the creditor's pledge
remains, D.13.7.18.2, and he can assert his actia Serviana.
C.8.13 (14) .15.108
E.

Debtor's Rights against Creditor or Third Parties

Naturally, since the debtor is the obligated party in the debtorcreditor relationship there is normally less occasion for concern
about the attainment of his rights than there is for the protection
of the creditor's security. Most of the rights the debtor enjoys
have already been enumerated, but an organized summary should
make his position clearer.
The most basic right he has is to recovery of possession, or
elimination of the creditor's interest, upon repayment. For failure
to reconvey, or for any other misfeasance regarding the pledge
upon the part of a creditor, the debtor had the actio Pigneraticia.
D.13.7.9.3,4. If fiducia were involved, in similar circumstances
the debtor had the personal actio fiduciae, which did not bring
07
Extract
08

following 0.8.13(14).24 in 14 Scott, The Civil Law 257 (1931).
The pledge persisted despite any type of unconsented transfer by the

debtor. "It is certain that a debtor cannot prejudice the rights of a creditor

by either selling, donating, bequeathing, or leaving under a trust the property
pledged .... " C.8.13 (14).15.
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reconveyance but did carry the greatly feared penalty of infamia.10 9
G.4.182. Against third parties engaged in some misfeasance regarding the pledge, the debtor had all the remedies of an owner,
especially the actio rei vindicatio.
The rights of the debtor to tender the debt and demand reconveyance generally ended when the creditor exercised his power of
sale. The debtor could still tender to the third party purchaser
and demand reconveyance if the contract of sale granted him that
right, or if there were some equitable cause, as the debtor was a
ward, or under 25, etc. D.20.5.7.1. When a subsequent creditor
without possession purchased the rights of a prior creditor in
possession, and took the pledges, the debtor had the right to tender
the amount paid and retake the pledges (leaving of course the
subsequent creditor's own interest unaffected). D.20.5.5.1. If the
creditor's interest has passed to his heirs, of course the debtor
may still tender and compel reconveyance from them. P.2.13.6.
Even if the creditor has made a subpledge of the debt to his creditor, the initial debtor can pay the debt and demand reconveyance.
The second creditor then loses his interest in rem and is relegated
to his personal remedies against the initial creditor. D.20.1.13.2.
Once the debt has matured, the debtor has no right to prevent
the creditor from selling if there is an express agreement permitting sale, or in later times if the sale agreement is implied or
made an absolute right. But the debtor does have a right to the
notices imposed by law. And his right to demand any excess in
the sale over the value of the debt (superfluum, hyperocha) is a
personal right against the creditor, who cannot shift liability for
it to the purchaser. D.13.7.42.
If the debtor is unable to repay the creditor on the due date,
he may himself sell the res. This would obviously be more desirable for the debtor than sale by the creditor, as the latter's
interest in attaining the highest possible value for the res (above
the amount of the debt) would be slight. The debtor's right to sell
was clearly recognized for the general type of pledge, D.13.7.6.pr.;
20.5.7.2; P.2.13.3. Since a sale by the debtor to which the creditor does not consent does not extinguish the creditor's in rem
interest, D.13.7.18.2, the debtor must immediately take the requisite amount from the purchase price and tender it to the creditor
to pay the debt and release the pledge. P.2.13.3. This right of
IODInfamia, meant the exclusion from all offices of the state, inability to
act as an attorney and other civil disabilities. Even more important because
of the premium the Romans placed on fidelity and honor was the stigma attached to infamia. Hunter, Systematic and Historical Exposition of Roman
Law 431-32 n.1 (4th ed. 1903). Cf. Greenidge, Infamia 23-25, 131-34, 154-70
(1894).
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sale by the debtor was the proper solution to the problem of what
to do should the creditor, especially if in possession, refuse to sell
post maturity. D.13.7.6.pr. However, the debtor might agree to
waive his right of sale, and any sale in violation thereof would
be void. D.20.5.7.2.
F.

General and Tacit Pledges

A general pledge is one which covers all the property of the
debtor, or all the property which he has in one locale or involved
in one enterprise. A tacit pledge is one which arises at once by
operation of law instead of by personal agreement between the
parties, in virtue of some special relationship between the parties.
Since in neither case was possession in the creditor customary,
or in some instances even possible, the term kypotheca may (with
the reservations noted before) be used, and is indeed more appropriate here because of the proliferation of this type of pledge
by operation of law in post-classical times.
General pledge (hypotheca). - The use of the general kypotheca probably arose in conjunction with leases of agricultural
land and urban tenements, when all of the movable assets of the
tenants were pledged in payment of the rent and to cover possible
injuries to the leasehold. D.20.6.14 (Labeo) ; D.20.2.2. In classical
times the device became quite popular, and is cited by Gaius as a
frequent type of agreemnt in which the debtor pledged all the
property he now had or might subsequently acquire, "Quae nunc
habet et quae postea adquisierit."110 D.20.1.15.1. In Justinian's
time rules of construction were applied which permitted the use
of different phraseology to create the liability of a general pledge,
a sure sign that no need was felt to hem in the general pledge in
favor of special pledges. C.8.16 (17).9.
The possibilities of abuse inherent in the general pledge apparently rather early produced modifying constructions which
exempted necessities or items considered essential to the debtor's
well-being, e.g., clothing, household goods and essential slaves,
D.20.1.6; articles in daily use, D.20.1.7; a concubine, natural children, apprentices, D.20.1.8; C.8.16(17).1. The decline of small
agricultural holdings in the late empire prompted several imperial
decrees exempting the slaves, oxen, and tools of agricultural
laborers from seizure by creditors. C.8.16 (17).7; C.8.16 (17).8.
1 0
' The passage cited may be a post-classical interpolation, inasmuch as it
is stated in the form of an exception to the general rule that the creditor
must prove that a specific article was intended to be among the aggregate

pledged- the rule may be from Gaius, and the exception post-classical. But
in any event there are sufficient references from other jurists to establish
the classic use of the general hypotheca: D.20.1.6; D.20.1.7; D.20.1.8.
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Tacit pledges. - The tacit pledge is one created by operation
of law to protect persons in whose welfare the state has a peculiar
interest, or to safeguard persons whose loans are entitled to greater
commercial consideration. In classical times, the tacit pledge was
relatively rare, probably extending only to that of the ward on
purchases made by his guardian with the ward's money, that of
the fisc on the property of a delinquent taxpayer, that given to
one who lends money for essential repairs on a house,"' and per-2
1
haps that of the landlord on the property of his tenant for rent.
In post-classical times, the tacit pledge proliferated, and was a
substantial ingredient in creating what Mitteis calls a most unsecure security (auserst unsicher Sicherheit) : "There were numerous [tacit] pledges, very often in the nature of a general hypothec. . . . No creditor could ascertain how many prior pledges
already burdened the res newly pledged to him." 1x3 Since many
tacit pledges also enjoyed special priorities over regular pledges,
the problem was intensified.
The original tacit hypotheca, for the protection of special persons was that created for the ward. Because of the Roman rule
of agency that precluded the guardian from acting in the name
of the ward, any purchase or sale of property on behalf of the
ward was done in the guardian's name, and all proceeds continued
in the guardian's name. Hence it was essential to create a hypotheca. over this and other property of the guardian on behalf of
the ward. D.20.2.10; D.20.4.7.pr. Similar protection was later
granted on the property of the curator of one insane. C.5.70.7.5.
Justinian granted wives a tacit hypotheca on the property of their
husbands to guarantee their dos, C.5.12.30; and he likewise granted
one to legatees on the total estate held by the heirs to secure the
legacy. C.6.43.1.
The preeminent tacit pledge arising out of a commercial relationship was always that given to the state on behalf of unpaid
taxes on all of the delinquent taxpayer's property, D.49.14.28;
C.8.14(15).1. The earliest commercial tacit pledge as such was
probably that cited by Pomponius as given to the landlord of an
agricultural estate leased to a tenant over the crops as security
for the rent. D.20.2.7. Similar tacit hypothecas to secure rent
and payment for negligence by a tenant during occupancy were
those granted to the landlord of a house over everything brought
"'In determining whether this was a true pledge interest, or only a privilegiunr
exigendi, see Kaser § 110, at 390 & n.24.
L 2 Schulz 410-11. See also Levy, West Roman Vulgar Law 120 (1951).
3
11 Author's translation in text. "Es gibt zahlreiche Pfandrechte, die
wiederum meistens Generalhypotheken sind .... Kein Glaubiger vermag zu

ilbersehen, wieviel Pfandrechte bereits auf der ihm verpfandeten Sache
lasten." Sotmn-Mitteis 352.
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into the house by the lessee, D.20.2.2; D.20.2.4; C.8.14(15).7, (unless the property is intended to be only temporarily there, D.20.
2.7.1), and to the landlord of a warehouse over everything stored
in the warehouse. D.20.2.3. Finally a tacit pledge is given to anyone who lends money for necessary repairs to a building, or who
lends money to pay the workmen employed in making such repairs.
D.20.2.1. One interesting distinction drawn between urban and
rural estates, probably related in purpose to the protection of
agricultural laborers created by Justinian, was that although all
the property of the tenant brought on the urban tenement was
tacitly pledged, that brought on a rural tenement was not. D.20.2.4.
G.

Multiple Pledges: Rights of Subsequent Creditors
and Priorities

The use of the same res for several pledges was forbidden in
early German, Scandanavian and Greek law, for in each system
the pledge was of the forfeiture type, with the full value of the res
deemed given in the first pledge. 1 14 The same was undoubtedly
true in early Roman law when the pledge was forfeited to the
creditor on nonpayment."15 But as the Roman pledge developed
into the basic security interest of the later republican and classical
times, multiple hypothecation became quite common, and in postclassical times so prevalent as to require special and elaborate
regulation. It should be noted that although among several pledges
only one could be possessory, it made no difference in the application of the rules that developed whether possession was given to
the first creditor, a subsequent creditor, or to no creditor.
Types of multiple pledges.- A multiple pledge could arise in
three ways. First, as has been noted, the initial creditor might
make a sub-pledge of the res. The second creditor, aside from his
possible contractual rights against the first creditor, was in the
same status as a second creditor of the res, and could be relegated
to his personal remedies against the first creditor should the debtor
pay or sell the res. D.13.7.40.2; D.20.1.13.2. Second, the debtor
might pledge the res simultaneously to several creditors. Absent
special agreement, each of the simultaneous creditors had a full lien
on the res, D.20.1.16.8, and each had an equal right against the
debtor. D.13.7.20.1. Each creditor could use the actio Serviana
against third parties, but not against each other. D.20.1.10. But
simultaneous creditors were obviously comparatively rare. The
most common type of multiple pledge was that in which the credi" 4 Wigmore, The Pledge-Idea: A Study in Comparative Legal Ideas, 10
Harv. L. Rev. 321, 348 (1897); 11 Harv. L. Rev. 18, 20 (1897).
1SId. at 32; ef. Jfrs-Kunkel 160 n.1; Sohm-Mitteis 350 n.13.
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tors were successive in time and unrelated by agreement to each
other.
Rights of subsequent creditors.- As compared with the first
creditor, the rights of subsequent creditors were quite limited.
For that reason, for a debtor to pledge the same subject matter
twice without disclosing the original pledge was grounds for the
extra ordinariapraetorian penalty of steflionatus (swindling), unless the value of the pledge easily exceeded the amount of both
debts. D.13.7.36.1. The essential weakness of the subsequent creditor's position was that he had no direct way of realizing his security. He had no right of sale," 6 and if he tried to foreclose, the
prior creditor could bar his action with an exception based on his
prior right. D.20.4.12.pr. Even worse, the sale by the prior creditor absolutely cut off the later creditor's right in rem, D.20.4.12.7;
C.4.10.6; C.8.18(19).3, except if the subsequent pledge agreement
was construed as subjecting to the second debt only the extent
in value by which the res exceeded the prior debt. D.20.1.15.2.11T
However, the subsequent creditor did have an actio Serviana
against all third parties improperly in possession, though even
here if he recovered, it was only subject to the prior interest of
the earlier creditor. D.20.4.12.pr. On sale by the prior creditor,
the later creditors were entitled to any excess of the sale price over
the initial debt to satisfy their own debts, before any remnant
might go to the debtor.1 8 D.20.4.12.5; C.8.33 (34) .3.4. If the debtor
should sell to the initial creditor, or give the pledge to him in satisfaction of the debt, however, the rights of the subsequent creditor
were not cut off any more than by a sale of the debtor without
the consent of the prior creditor. C.8.19(20). Further, if the
debtor sold, and used the proceeds to pay the initial creditor, the
subsequent creditor had the right to pay the purchase price to
the buyer and take possession of the res from him. D.20.5.3.1. It
would appear, however, at least after a post-classical imperial
rescript, that if the initial creditor sold, the subsequent creditor
could not tender the purchase price to the buyer and recover the
object. C.8.19 (20) .3.
The right undoubtedly of the most practical significance to
the subsequent creditor was that of jus offerendi or succedendi,
for by it he stepped into the shoes of the prior creditor." 9 In the
116J5rs-Kunkel 160; Schulz 423.
liKaser § 110, at 390-92 & n.22.
118R would appear that in early classic times the excess went entirely to
the debtor, with subsidiary creditors limited then to personal rights against

the debtor. Schulz 424.

"19Ifthere was an intervening creditor, the subsequent creditor exercising
his ju&off'erendi took priorty only as to the amount of the initial creditor's

pledge, not as to the amount of his own original debt as well. So far as his

19611

ROMAN LAW OF REAL SECURITY

jus offerendi, of his own volition he paid the prior creditor; in the
jus succedendi he paid on behalf of the debtor when the prior
creditor threatened to sell or foreclose. By this right he not only
protected his own subsequent in rem rights, but perhaps more
important could acquire a clear title for sale himself (especially
necessary for land).120 By exercise of the jus offerendi, the subsequent creditor acquired the exclusive position of creditor.
C.8.13(14).22; C.8.17(18).5. He could then sell not only for the
amount of his debt, but also for the amount of all prior debts
purchased. D.20.5.5.pr. If the prior creditor refused to accept the
money tendered, he automatically lost his in rem rights against
the debtor and superiority over the offering subsequent creditor,
D.20.4.11.4; however, the subsequent creditor must pay the money
tendered into deposit, and could not thereafter use it as his own,
C.8.17(18).1. The ju&offerendi was available to a subsequent
creditor even if the prior creditor was the state itself. C.8.18 (19) .4.
General priority rules. - The most basic rule as to the rights
of multiple creditors inter so was that of first in time, first in
right - prior tempore, potior iure. D.20.4.12.pr.; C.8.17 (18) .8. In
applying it, there was no preference for special creditors over general creditors as to the specific thing pledged. If the pledge of
the general creditor was prior, and required all of the property of
the debtor to satisfy the debt, the special creditor was totally subordinated. D.20.4.2.; C.8.17 (18).6. If the state's pledge were later
in time (and not privileged, as for taxes), it likewise would be
subordinated to a prior private lien. C.8.17 (18).3. Determination
of time was based upon the date of the act of pledging, not the date
of an agreement to pledge. D.20.4.11.pr. 1 21 But if there was a pledge
to C1 on a certain condition, followed by a pledge to C2 absolutely,
and then the required conditon happened, Cl's pledge acquired
retroactively priority in time. D.20.4.11.1.
Some apparent exceptions resulted from unusual circumstances.
Thus, if the same res was pledged to C1, then to C2, and then again
for another sum to C1, C2 had priority over the debt resulting
from the second pledge to C1. D.20.4.12.3. Likewise if C1 has a
general hypotheca over all the property the debtor shall bring
upon leased land, and C2 subsequently lends the debtor money on
a specific res not upon the land, when the debtor later brings it
upon the land, C2's lien is regarded as prior, as to that specific
own original pledge was concerned, the subsequent creditor was still subordinate120to the intervening creditor. See Schulz 424-25.
Buckland, op. cit. supra note 95, at 322.
12iThis may require some clarification. If the debtor agreed with C2 that
C2 should have the pledge if he ever borrowed from him, this agreement was
of no force against a subsequent pledge to C1, even though the debtor in fact
later borrowed from C2. D.20.4.11.pr.
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res. D.20.4.11.2. And if C1 lends the debtor money without security, then the debtor pledges a res to C2, and only later gives the
res as security to C1, also, C2 is deemed prior. D.20.4.12.2.
In all the above situations, the pledge to C2 was in some significant way considered prior in time, and therefore could be prior
in right. In one case it could be subsequent in time and still prior
in right: if C1 specifically consented to the debtor's second encumbrance of the pledge. Then the only issue was as to Cl's condition:
was he deemed to have relinquished his pledge altogether, or
merely to have agreed to subordination to C2? This was treated
as an isue of fact. D.20.4.12.4.
Finally, it should be noted that in suits among multiple creditors, the Romans soundly limited the doctrine of res judicata to
the actual parties involved. Thus if in a suit between C3 and C1,
C3 prevailed, this did not give him priority over C2. C2 had not
been involved in the suit, and his priority could not be indirectly
cut off. D.20.4.16.
SpeciaZ priorities.- The rule of p7ior tempore, potior iure, was
steadily eroded by the granting of special priorities by law to
protect certain weaker parties, or to encourage some desirable
relation. Looking to its own interests first, the state created a
privileged position for any pledge to the fisc (tacit or contractual)
for unpaid taxes. D.49.14.28; C.4.46.1. A purchaser from the
treasury of this pledge enjoyed the same priority. C.8.18(19).2.
Justinian, in creating the tacit hypothec. for the wife's dos,
gave it priority over subsequent pledges as well. C.5.12.30;
C.8.17 (18).12.1.
Certain commercial acts also gave rise to priorities. Thus, the
creditor who lent the money for the purchase of the pledge itself
(usually land) had priority as to that pledge over any other creditors, C.8.17 (18).7, a rule not unlike the priority we accord to our
purchase price mortgages. To insure greater commercial flow, two
rules were adopted to give priority to those who enhanced commerce significantly. A subsequent creditor had priority where his
loan was for the preservation of the property itself, as one who
loaned money to repair a ship, D.20.4.5, and in general a subsequent
creditor was preferred who loaned money for the preservation or
transportation of merchandise, D.20.4.6.1,2.
The possibility of creating informal multiple hypothecas on the
same pledge with no indication of the existence of any at all
(especially in land, where transfer of possession to the creditor
was unlikley) gave rise to a considerable lack of certainty in
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secured transactions. Although a system of title registration existed
in Egypt and to some extent in Greece,12 2 this excellent device was
never adopted by Roman law. The emperor Leo did adopt a system
giving priorities to registered hypothecas, but it was largely ineffectual on two counts. It was really only a system of proving
execution of a hypotheca: if the hypotheca were drawn up by a
public official as a notary, or if it were subscribed by three honorable and upright witnesses, it was entitled to priority over hypothecas not so created. C.8.17(18).11. It is readily apparent that
there is no real certainty when the document signed by three witnesses could still be totally secret, and secondly, there would in
no case be more than temporary or local publicity since there was
no permanent registry system.
Effect of priorities.- It is noteworthy that although a considerable variety of special preferences for different types of
pledges, especially in late and post-classical times, came into existence, there was never developed any systematic method of handling
them. We are not even sure of the priority where several of these
privileged pledges came into conflict. Pledges for the payment of
taxes to the fisc were probably first, and then the wife's hypotheca
for her dos, 2 3 but what was the order, if any, among the other
privileged pledges is quite uncertain. Quite possibly, it was once
again an order based on time among the privileged pledges themselves. 24
In any event, this proliferation of privileged as well as that
of tacit hypothecas may be regarded as a fundamental defect in
the Roman law of real security. Both might have been overcome
in part by a sound sytem of recordation and registration, but this
device was never used by the Romans. The creditor, especially in
later history, was in a most precarious condition. Not only had
he never a clear assurance that there existed no earlier pledges
upon the subject matter (for the creation of pledges by agreement was always an informal matter, and in any event a tacit
hypotheca might also be a hidden encumbrance), he could not rest
assured that his temporal priority might not be disturbed suddenly by a privileged pledge. Sohm-Mitteis puts it quite nicely
by noting that any security remaining after considering the possibility of tacit pledges "is destroyed by the privileged pledges. Who
today is the prior creditor may find himself tomorrow transformed
into a subsequent one."' 2 5 It is no wonder that Roman creditors
122

Radin, Roman Law 207 (1927).
i23Cf.
Buckland, Text-Book 480; Jrs-Kunkel 160.
24
' Cf. Hunter,
op. cit. supra note 109, at 442-43.
25
1 Author's translation in text. "wird durch die Pfandprivilegien zerst~rt.

Wer heute noch vorgehender Pfandgliubiger ist, kann sich morgen in einen
nachstehenden verwandeln." Sohm-Mitteis 352.
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appear to have preferred personal security to such a tenuous real
security.'2 6
Extinction of the Pledge

H.

The most obvious method of extinguishing a pledge is payment
of the debt, or satisfaction in the manner prescribed by the initial
agreement. D.20.6.6.pr. Payment by a third party, even if unknown to the debtor, will also end the pledge if the payment is
intended on the debtor's behalf. D.20.6.1.pr. If the creditor should
refuse the due payment by the debtor, then the debtor may seal
the money in deposit, and bring suit for the release of the pledge.
C.8.13(14).20. If the initial agreement contained a condition permitting rescission, the debtor may avail himself of such clause and
rescind. D.20.6.3. If this release was not formal- for example,
when the creditor simply remained silent while the debtor sold
the res to a third party- then it did not totally extinguish the
pledge, but did give rise to an effective exceptio pacti or doli.
D.20.6.7.2.12 7
The pledge may also be eliminated by a renunciation or release
by the creditor. D.13.7.9.3; D.20.6.5.pr. A renunciation of the right
to demand payment may be made for a specific time, and the pledge
is protected within that time. D.20.6.5.1. There is no release,
though, if a creditor in possession of the res is induced to return
it to the debtor through fraud. D.13.7.3. A novation of the debt
acts as a release unless the pledge is expressly retained in the new
contract. D.13.7.11.1.
A release also occurs where the creditor consents to the sale
by the debtor. D.20.6.4.1; D.50.17.158; C.8.25(26) .4. Consent to
the sale will be implied when the creditor is notified of it, and
takes no action to prevent it although he has opportunity to do so.
C.8.25 (26) .6. But where the creditor is a ward, he cannot consent
to the sale without the concurrence of his guardian, D.20.6.7.pr,
and a general agent or managing slave cannot consent for the
creditor unless expressly authorized. D.20.6.7.1. A filius familias
or a slave who has given the loan for the pledge out of his peculium
can consent to release the debt provided he receives some consideration for doing so. D.20.6.8.5.
Unusual circumstances can vitiate the creditor's consent to sale
or other disposition by the debtor. Thus, if the creditor consents
to a sale within a specified time, a later sale does not cut off the
pledge. D.20.6.8.18. But if the creditor gives the debtor the right
126

Buckland, op. cit. supra note 95, at 320.

12 7Kaser § 110, at 392.
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to sell, and on the latter's decease the pledge passes into the hands
of the heir who sells, the latter sale is deemed authorized, on the
theory that the courts will not investigate subtle issues of the
creditor's intent. D.20.6.8.16. If the creditor consents to a sale,
but the debtor makes a gift, the pledge remains; while if the
creditor consents to a gift, but the debtor sells, the pledge is released (unless the creditor's consent was contingent upon the
donee's being a specified friend of the creditor's). D.20.6.8.13.
The distinction is eminently sensible: the creditor may have consented to the sale only so that he would be repaid, and how can
he be repaid if the debtor makes a gift? But if the creditor allows
the debtor to give the pledge away, how is the creditor injured if
the debtor chooses to profit from it instead?
Even though released, the pledge may subsequently revive. If
the debtor sells with the creditor's consent, but the sale is later
rescinded, the pledge reattaches to the res. D.20.6.10.pr. Likewise,
when the creditor consents to the debtor's bequeathing the pledge
by legacy, if the legacy is rejected, the pledge revives upon the res
in the possession of the heir. D.20.6.8.11.
Following the rule that the causa. pignoris indivis est, the
creditor retains his pledge until the full debt is satisfied, even
though one of several co-debtors (as the heirs of an original debtor) has paid his share. C.8.31(32).1; C.8.31(32).2. As has been
noted above, even though the debt secured by the pledge has been
paid, and the pledge released, a creditor in possession may remain
in possession by the jus retendi of Gordian should the debtor continue to owe any unsecured debts. C.8.26(27).1. This retention
however was in the nature of a lien, not an implied new pledge.
Should the creditor sue a third party on possession under his
actio Servicna and recover damages, the in rem rights of the creditor are ended, and he is precluded by his election of remedies as
well from proceeding in personam against the debtor. D.20.6.8.19.
However, should the creditor initially sue the debtor on the pledge,
a judgment does not end his in rem rights. Only satisfaction of
the judgment or the giving of fresh security will do so, for otherwise the creditor will have lost his in rem right in the pledge
for an in personam right in the satisfaction of the judgment.
D.20.1.13.4.
The in rem interest of a subsequent creditor is extinguished
by sale of the pledge by a prior creditor, although the subsequent
creditor retains his personal right to recover on the debt and is
entitled to first call on any excess from the sale. D.20.4.12.5;
C.8.33 (34).3.4. Likewise, a prior creditor who refused to accept
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the money tendered him in payment of his debt by a subsequent
creditor exercising his right of jus offerendi or succedendi has
impliedly released the pledge. D.20.4.11.4.
The last common method of extinction of the pledge was by
agreement of the creditor to accept the personal protection of a
surety instead. D.20.6.5.2; D.20.6.14. Three less common ways
were by merger, destruction of the res, and prescription. Merger
of interests could occur when the creditor acquired title to the
res, as when he was the heir of the debtor. 28 Although changes
in the external form of the pledge do not affect the existence of
the pledge (substitution of a house for a garden), D.20.1.16.2,
under some circunistances the physical destruction of the res (as
a chattel) will end the pledge, leaving the creditor to his personal
remedies. D.20.6.8.pr.
Extinction of the pledge by longi temporis'praescriptiawas
a late classical innovation. If the creditor refrained from acting
for the period of the prescription, and the other requirements were
met, the debtor was protected. C.4.10.7. However, the creditor
might still resort to personal remedies against the debtor. C.7.36.1.
But if the debtor gave the res to a third party, and the latter remained undisturbed in possession for the prescriptive period, not
only was the pledge ended, but the creditor lost his in personam
rights against the donee as well. C.7.36.2.
12SMerger could also occur in a rather interesting manner. Suppose the
debtor is the bona fide possessor of a res, which he pledges to the creditor.
The true owner dies, leaving the creditor as his heir. The pledge ends, and
the creditor becomes the owner, with in personam rights against the debtor
on the debt. D.13.7.29.

